The Applicability of the Duress Defense to the Killing of Innocent Persons by Civilians by Heim, Sarah J.
Cornell International Law Journal
Volume 46
Issue 1 Winter 2013 Article 6
The Applicability of the Duress Defense to the
Killing of Innocent Persons by Civilians
Sarah J. Heim
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell International Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Heim, Sarah J. (2013) "The Applicability of the Duress Defense to the Killing of Innocent Persons by Civilians," Cornell International
Law Journal: Vol. 46: Iss. 1, Article 6.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol46/iss1/6
The Applicability of the Duress Defense
to the Killing of Innocent Persons
by Civilians
Sarah J. Heimt
Introduction ........................................ 166
1. The Defense of Duress ........................... 167
II. The Development of the Duress Defense Under
International Criminal Law .... ...................... 170
A. Post-World War Two Trials: Duress vs. Superior
Orders.................................. 170
B. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia: Prosecutor v. Erdemovi ................ 171
1. Background ....................................... 171
2. The Appellate Chamber's Opinions ................ 173
C. The Rome Statute ......... ....................... 177
III. Applying Current International Law Standards to Pleas of
Duress by Civilian Perpetrators ..................... 178
A. Applicable Law .............................. 178
B. Case Studies ................................ 181
1. Former Concentration Camp Capo Johann Vican... 181
2. Ftlix ................................... 184
C. Application of the Defense of Duress to the Case Study
Defendants ................................. 186
1. The Act Charged Was Done Under an Imminent
Threat of Death or Serious Bodily Harm ........... 186
2. There Was No Adequate Means of Escaping the
Threat .................................. 187
3. The Crime Committed Was Not Disproportionate to
the Evil Threatened, so that the Harm Caused by
Obeying the Order Did Not Outweigh the Harm
Threatened Against the Defendant .............. 188
4. The Defendant Did Not Voluntarily Place Himself
in a Situation in Which He Would be Required to
Perform the Unlawful Act .................... 188
5. The Defendant Did Not Owe Any Special Duty of
Care Toward the Victim ............... ....... 189
t Candidate for J.D. at Cornell Law School, 2013; B.A. in German and Political
Science, Dickinson College, 2007. 1 would like to thank the editors of the Cornell
International Law Journal for all of their hard work in the editing process, Professors
Menachem Rosensaft and Jens Ohlin for their helpful feedback, and my wonderful
friends and family for all of their support throughout the past three years of law school.
46 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 165 (2013)
Cornell International Law Journal
D. Summary of the Analysis of the Case Studies .......... 190
C onclusion ...................................................... 190
Introduction
Defendants have raised duress as a defense to charges of war crimes
and crimes against humanity since the Allies held the first large-scale war
crimes trials at Nuremberg in the wake of the Second World War.'
Although the International Military Tribunal (IMT) generally rejected the
defendants' attempts to use duress as a defense, it never went so far as to
rule out the defense.2 More recently, the Appeals Chamber for the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) held that duress
can never serve as a full defense for a soldier charged with crimes against
humanity or war crimes where the soldier has killed innocent people.3
However, since the ICTY limited its analysis to whether soldiers can assert a
defense of duress, an international criminal court has yet to address the
question of whether civilians can assert a complete defense of duress where
they have been accused of war crimes or crimes against humanity for the
killing of an innocent person.4
Draten Erdemovit was tried before the ICTY after he admitted to par-
ticipating in the mass execution of over 1,200 Muslim men and boys near
Srebrenica. 5 Although he pled guilty, Erdemovit claimed he only partici-
pated in the killings because his superior threatened him with "instant
death" if he did not comply with the order.6 The trial court accepted
Erdemovit's guilty plea and refused to allow him to assert an affirmative
defense of duress.7
On appeal, the plurality denied a defense of duress for soldiers
accused of committing war crimes or crimes against humanity where the
crime involved the killing of innocent people.8 In establishing a prohibi-
tion against the use of the defense of duress, the plurality stressed the
importance of policy considerations. These considerations included the
concern that international law should serve as a guide for the conduct of
combatants and their commanders. 9 The plurality also emphasized the
1. See generally United States v. Ohlendorf, Case No. 9, Opinion and Judgment, in 4
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL
COUNCIL LAW No. 10 411, 470-88 (1948) (reviewing foreign military penal codes and
international law in dismissing defendants' claims of duress as a defense).
2. Id.
3. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge
McDonald and Judge Vohrah, 88 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7,
1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/acjug/en/erd-asojmcd971007e.pdf.
4. Id. 41.
5. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, R 77 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 1996), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
erdemovic/tjug/en/erd-tsj961129e.pdf.
6. Id. 80.
7. Id. T9 19-20.
8. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge
McDonald and Judge Vohrah, 84.
9. Id. 80.
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need to hold soldiers to a higher level of accountability than civilians
because individuals with military training are expected to "exercise forti-
tude and a greater degree of resistance to a threat than civilians."10
In his dissent, Justice Cassese rejected the plurality's adoption of the
common law rule on duress and argued that international courts should
allow defendants to raise duress as a defense to the killing of innocent
people under very limited circumstances." Cassese argued in favor of
allowing the defense by emphasizing that the defendant must show that
the harm caused by submitting to the coercive order was not greater than
the harm that would have been caused if the defendant had refused to fol-
low the order.12
This Note argues that international criminal courts should allow civil-
ians to raise a defense of duress against charges of war crimes or crimes
against humanity. Civilian defendants will likely find it easier to meet the
conditions laid out by the dissent in the Erdemovic decision; civilians who
commit war crimes often lack an adequate means of escape and are placed
in their situations involuntarily by other actors. Unlike in cases involving
members of the military, society does not assign a higher duty to civilians
for the protection of innocent lives. 13 Given the distinctions between the
circumstances surrounding civilians as compared to soldiers, an interna-
tional court should allow the defense of duress for civilian defendants
charged with war crimes or crimes against humanity.
The first part of the Note examines the general jurisprudence of the
defense of duress, including differences among common and civil law
countries and current customary international law. The second part
focuses on the ICTY Appellate Chamber's opinion in the Erdemovie case,
which set the current precedent for the applicability of the duress defense
in war crimes trials of soldiers. The third part proposes a new interna-
tional standard for the defense of duress when raised by civilians who have
killed an innocent person and are accused of war crimes or crimes against
humanity. The fourth part applies these standards to historical situations
in which civilians could have raised duress as a defense. In particular, this
Note examines war crimes trials against former concentration camp capos
after the Second World War and trials against Hutu civilians who partici-
pated in the killing squads in Rwanda.
I. The Defense of Duress
Under international criminal law, a defendant can raise an affirmative
defense of duress when "the person, faced with an imminent danger to life,
10. Id. 9 84.
11. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opin-
ion of Judge Cassese, 12 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/acjug/en/erd-adojcas971007e.pdf.
12. Id. 42.
13. See Luis E. Chiesa, Duress, Demanding Heroism, and Proportionality, 41 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 741, 764-67 (2008) (discussing voluntary and involuntary obligations of
self-sacrifice).
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limb, or freedom that cannot otherwise be averted, commits an unlawful
act to avert the danger away from himself or herself, a relative, or a person
close to himself or herself."14 To constitute duress (as opposed to neces-
sity), the threat must "emanate[ ] from a human being."15 The threat must
be imminent such that "the fear caused by the threat must be operating on
the mind of the actor at the time of the criminal act."16 The law also
requires that the person under duress have no way to avoid the impending
harm.' 7 Thus, "successful duress claims typically involve threatened inju-
ries that will follow nearly instantly if the coerced actor fails to obey."18
Most courts also require that the coerced actor is not responsible for the
circumstances of his duress. 19 For example, under international law a tri-
bunal will examine "the issue of voluntary participation in an enterprise
that leaves no doubt as to its end results" to ascertain the criminal culpabil-
ity of the accused.20
In addition to the general requirements to establish a duress defense,
the law may impose additional requirements on actors who have a pre-
existing duty of care. Criminal law generally sets expectations for the "rea-
sonable man," rather than for the "reasonable hero." 21 Therefore, the law
does not demand that ordinary people engage in acts of heroism or self-
sacrifice.22 However, if a coerced person has voluntarily assumed a special
duty vis-a-vis others, the law may require a greater level of resistance from
that person.23
Legal scholars debate whether duress should be categorized as a justi-
fication or an excuse defense. While justification defenses acquit persons
whose actions were justifiable, excuse defenses render persons "personally
blameless . . . for their unjustifiable conduct."24 Many common law legal
scholars view duress as a justification defense. 25 Traditionally, defendants
may raise a justification defense when "the harm of violating the law is
outweighed by a greater good."26 Under this theory, courts should recog-
nize duress as an exculpatory defense if and only if the "commission of the
14. 1 MODEL CODES FOR POST-CONFLICT CRIMINAL JUSTICE: MODEL CRIMINAL CODE art.
25, § 2 (Vivienne O'Connor & Colette Rausch eds., 2007).
15. Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching
for Its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1331, 1339 (1989).
16. Id. at 1340.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1341.
20. GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, DEFENSES IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL CRIMI-
NAL LAw 58 (2d ed. 2008).
21. Chiesa, supra note 13, at 757.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 764-65; see also Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint
Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, 1 80 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/acjug/en/erd-
asojmcd971007e.pdf.
24. Dressler, supra note 15, at 1349.
25. See Chiesa, supra note 13, at 748.
26. See Douglas Husak, The 'But Everybody Does That!' Defense, in THE PHILosOPHY
OF CRIMINAL LAw: SELECTED ESSAYS 338, 353 (2010).
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crime is a lesser evil or social harm than that threatened."27 The defendant
would argue that although he knowingly violated the law, his illegal act
was not actually wrongful. Therefore, to analyze a defendant's coerced
actions, juries would be required to engage in balancing tests weighing the
gravity of the threatened harm against the harm that the coerced defen-
dant's actions caused.
In contrast to justification defenses, defendants can raise an excuse
defense "to allege that [he] is not to blame for what he has done, even
though what he has done may have been wrongful."28 Thus the actor rec-
ognizes that his actions were both unlawful and wrong; he argues, however,
that he should be excused for his actions since he committed them under
duress.
Various policy arguments support the excuse theory of duress. The
Human Frailty Theory posits that society should not punish an actor for
committing a wrongful act if most members of society would have acted in
a similar manner.29 This theory is based on the rationale that "the coerced
wrongdoer behaved in a statistically normal manner in particularly com-
pelling circumstances." 3 0  The second theory supporting the duress
defense is the Involuntariness Theory, which states that although a person
acting under duress had the capacity to make the right (moral) choice, he
"lacked a fair opportunity to avoid acting unlawfully."3' The Involuntari-
ness Theory asserts that "the actor's choice to protect her interests at the
expense of others is in reality 'no choice at all' and that duress exculpates
the actor because her capacity to choose to do otherwise is 'absent' in light
of the coercion."32 The coercion exerted upon the actor effectively
"overb[ears]" the actor's ability to make a true choice under the
circumstances.3 3
States differ in whether they recognize duress as a complete defense to
the murder of an innocent person. Generally, common law states impose a
strict prohibition against duress for murder, whereas civil law countries
allow the defense under certain circumstances. 34 The penal codes of most
civil law states allow duress as a complete defense to all offenses, including
murder, provided the defendant was not responsible for placing himself in
the situation causing the duress.35 In contrast, the common law prohibits
27. Dressler, supra note 15, at 1351.
28. Husak, supra note 26, at 354.
29. See, e.g., Dressler, supra note 15, at 1363 (referring to an "'I Am Only Human'
claim").
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1365.
32. Chiesa, supra note 13, at 758.
33. Id. at 759 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
34. See generally Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opin-
ion ofJudge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, ' 59 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugosla-
via Oct. 7, 1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/acjug/en/erd-asojmcd97100
7e.pdf (providing an overview of the duress defense in various civil law and common
law countries).
35. Id.
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the use of duress as a defense to murder on policy grounds.3 6 In the Brit-
ish case R. v. Howe, Lord Mackay wrote:
It seems to me plain that the reason that it was for so long stated by writers
of authority that the defence of duress was not available in a charge of mur-
der was because of the supreme importance that the law afforded to the
protection of human life and that it seemed repugnant that the law should
recognise in any individual in any circumstances, however, extreme, the
right to choose that one innocent person should be killed rather than
another.37
The common law's absolute prohibition on the use of duress to defend
a homicide charge is "likely based on the deontological claim that it is mor-
ally wrong to kill innocent persons, even if the coerced homicidal act
might" be excused by other factors.38
II. The Development of the Duress Defense Under International
Criminal Law
A. Post-World War Two Trials: Duress vs. Superior Orders
The IMT outlined its requirements for duress as an affirmative defense
to war crimes and crimes against humanity in United States v. Ohlendorf
(the Einsatzgruppen Case). In compliance with Article 8 of the Charter of
the International Military Tribunal, the IMT rejected the defense of supe-
rior orders when the orders were manifestly illegal.3 9 However, the court
stated that a defendant could raise the defense of duress if he was coerced
to carry out an unlawful order. 40 In order to raise a successful duress
claim, the IMT required a defendant to satisfy the traditional criteria for
duress: the existence of an imminent, real, and inevitable threat.4 1 The
defendant must also prove that he performed the coerced act against his
will.42 If the defendant in fact "approved of the principle involved in the
order," the defense of duress failed.4 3 Additionally, a defendant could only
retain the right to assert a defense of duress if his objection to the illegal
activity was "constant," and he never acquiesced to the "illegal character" of
the order.4 4
The IMT additionally applied a "no fault" requirement to defendants
claiming duress: if the defendant should have anticipated the order to com-
mit the illegal act, based on his knowledge of the mission and prior acts of
the organization to which he had voluntarily become a member, he should
36. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANTY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAw 487 (2d ed. 1999).
37. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge
McDonald and Judge Vohrah, ' 71.
38. Dressler, supra note 15, at 1352.
39. United States v. Ohlendorf, supra note 1, at 471.
40. Id. at 480-82.
41. Id. at 480.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 481.
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not be excused for his crime.45 The IMT stated: "One who embarks on a
criminal enterprise of obvious magnitude is expected to anticipate what
the enterprise will logically lead to."4 6 Therefore, to apply this "no fault"
requirement courts had to assess whether a reasonable person in the defen-
dant's position would have anticipated the illegal order.47
The IMT also required the defendant to show that "the harm caused
by obeying the illegal order is not disproportionally greater than the harm
which would result from not obeying the illegal order."48 In a situation
where the defendant lacked the opportunity to prevent a greater or equal
harm from occurring compared to the harm threatened against him, the
IMT concluded that the defendant lacked any "moral choice" in the out-
come and therefore should be able to assert a defense of duress.49 High-
lighting this approach, the IMT declared: "Let it be said at once that there is
no law which requires that an innocent man must forfeit his life or suffer
serious harm in order to avoid committing a crime which he condemns....
No court will punish a man who, with a loaded pistol at his head, is com-
pelled to pull a lethal lever."5 0 By imposing a balancing test in which the
harm caused must be "disproportionately greater" than the harm
threatened, the court left the interpretation and application of this stan-
dard open for future tribunals.
B. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia:
Prosecutor v. Erdemovie
1. Background
The next major international judicial decision on the applicability of
the defense of duress to charges of war crimes and crimes against human-
ity came in the wake of the ethnic cleansings that occurred during the Bos-
nian War.5 1 The defendant, Draten Erdemovic, was born in 1971 in
Bosnia and Herzegovina in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo-
45. Id. at 480-81.
46. Id. at 481.
47. For a discussion on what the law should require of the concept of "the reasona-
ble person" in duress cases, see Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks' essay Law in the Heart of Dark-
ness: Atrocity and Duress, arguing that courts should use a "stronger conception" of the
reasonable person standard requiring that "a person must be reasonable not in the sense
of being ordinary, but in the sense of thinking through his actions and their conse-
quences in a thoughtful, reasoned way, and behaving in ways that are sensible, careful,
and prudent." Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Essay, Law in the Heart of Darkness: Atrocity and
Duress, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 861, 872 (2003).
48. United States v. Ohlendorf, supra note 1, at 471.
49. Id.; see also Matthew Lippman, Conundrums of Armed Conflict: Criminal Defenses
to Violations of the Humanitarian Law of War, 15 DICK. J. INT'L L. 1, 19-23 (1997)
(describing the "voluntariness test" created at Nuremberg: "An individual carrying out a
clearly criminal command under international law is culpable absent evidence that he
lacked moral choice - that his action was the product of duress or coercion. This equiv-
ocal standard was subsequently endorsed by the United Nations and cited in subse-
quent prosecutions of Nazi war criminals.").
50. United States v. Ohlendorf, supra note 1, at 480.
51. KNoops, supra note 20, at 57.
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slavia.52 He was a Bosnian citizen and self-identified as a Croat." In
1990, he began serving in the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), which
included soldiers of Slovenian, Serbian, Hungarian, and Albanian ori-
gins.54 In May or July of 1992, Erdemovit was summoned to join the army
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but he did not want to participate in the Bos-
nian War and subsequently left the army in November 1992." He then
joined the military police of the Croatian Defense Council (HVO), where
he served until November 1993.56 While serving in the HVO, Erdemovit
was "beaten . .. for having helped Serbian women and children to return to
their territory."57
Due to financial and personal security concerns, Erdemovit enlisted
in the Army of Republika Srpska (the Bosnian Serb Army) in April 1994.58
During a hearing before his trial, he claimed that his "decision to serve in
that army was based on his need for money to feed himself and his wife,
his desire to obtain identity papers in order to travel freely and the assur-
ance of some status as a Croat in Republika Srpska."59 At the same hear-
ing, he asserted that he had joined the 10th Sabotage Unit of the Army of
Republika Srpska because, compared to other divisions, it had an ethni-
cally diverse group of soldiers. 60
On July 16, 1995, a unit commander ordered Erdemovic and seven
other members of his unit to "prepare . . . for a mission."61 Erdemovit
claimed that they had no knowledge of the purpose of the mission.62
When the men arrived at the Branjevo collective farm near Pilica, they were
told that they were going to aid in the killing of hundreds of Muslim men.63
"The [Muslim] men were unarmed civilians who had surrendered to the ...
Bosnian Serb army . . . after the fall of the United Nations 'safe area' at
Srebrenica." 64 Erdemovic claimed that although he instantly refused to
take part in the massacre, he was told: "If you don't wish to do it, stand in
line with the rest of them and give others your rifle so that they can shoot
you."65 Erdemovit stated that had he not carried out the order, he believed
that he and his family would have been killed.66 He also claimed that he
witnessed the commander ordering someone else to be killed for refusing
52. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment, 102 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 1996), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
erdemovic/tjug/en/erd-tsj961129e.pdf.
53. Id.
54. Id. ' 105. Note thatJNA is the Serbo-Croatian acronym for the Yugoslav People's
Army.
55. Id. T 79.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. Id.
61. Id. 80.
62. Id.
63. Id. 9 2, 80.
64. Id. 91 2.
65. Id. T 80 (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. Id.
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to obey orders. 67 Despite the threat, Erdemovit attempted to save a man
who claimed to have saved Serbs from Srebrenica. 68 However, his com-
manding officer ordered the man to be executed to ensure that there were
no witnesses. 69 By the end of the day, Erdemovit and his comrades had
executed approximately 1,200 Muslim men. 70 The prosecutor estimated
that Erdemovic himself was personally responsible for the deaths of
between ten and one hundred individuals.7 '
A lieutenant colonel then ordered the unit to execute an additional five
hundred Muslim men who were being held in a public building in Pilica.72
Erdemovic and three of his comrades refused to obey the order, and all four
men were excused from participating in the executions.73 Several days
later, a fellow soldier attempted to kill Erdemovic and two of his friends,
allegedly because they had refused to participate in the second round of
killings.74 Erdemovit was seriously wounded and subsequently treated in
hospitals in Bijeljina and Belgrade.75
After his release from the hospital, Erdemovit contacted a journalist to
whom he then confided his story. 76 Serbian officers arrested him two days
after the interview, and he arrived at The Hague on March 30, 1996.77
Following his arrest, Erdemovit vigorously communicated his remorse for
his crimes and expressed his "loathing of [the] war and nationalism . "78
2. The Appellate Chamber's Opinions
The lower court accepted Erdemovit's guilty pleas for the charges
against him. On appeal from this decision, the judges of the appellate
chamber split three to two on the issue of whether duress could provide a
complete defense to a soldier who participated in the killing of innocent
civilians.79 Judges McDonald and Vohrah wrote a joint opinion on behalf
of the court finding the duress defense unavailable to soldiers under these
circumstances.80 Judge Li wrote a separate and dissenting opinion, in
which he affirmed the plurality's general holding, but rejected their deci-
sion to remand the case to the trial chamber so that Erdemovit could re-
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. 1 77.
71. Id. 85.
72. Id. 1 81.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge
McDonald and Judge Vohrah, 91 41 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct.
7, 1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/acjug/en/erd-asojmcd971007e.pdf
(confining its inquiry explicitly "to whether duress is a complete defence for a soldier
who has been charged under international law with killing innocent persons" (emphasis
added)).
80. See generally id.
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plead in light of the disallowance of the defense of duress.81 Judges Cas-
sese and Stephen each submitted a separate and dissenting opinion, both
finding that a defendant can assert duress as a complete defense to the
charge of killing innocent civilians so long as the harm caused was not
disproportionate to the harm threatened.8 2
In establishing an absolute prohibition on soldiers' invocation of
duress as an affirmative defense to the murder of innocents, the plurality
focused primarily on policy arguments.83 After examining the outer limits
of the duress defense in the domestic codes of various civil and common
law countries, as well as the decisions of post-World War Two military
tribunals, the plurality concluded that there existed no international norm
recognizing duress as a defense for crimes involving the murder of inno-
cent civilians.84 The plurality rejected the IMT's decision in the Einsatz-
gruppen case as lacking sufficient support85 and instead focused on the
policy considerations underlying the common law "normative mandate"
against the use of duress to excuse murder charges. Quoting Professor
Hersch Lauterpacht's criticism of the Einsatzgruppen decision, the plurality
asserted that:
[n]o principle of justice and, in most civilised communities, no principle of
law permits the individual person to avoid suffering or even to save his life
at the expense of the life-or, as revealed in many war crimes trials, of a vast
multitude of lives-[or of] sufferings, on a vast scale, of others.86
The plurality further expounded that "the law should not be the product or
slave of logic or intellectual hair-splitting, but must serve broader norma-
tive purposes in light of its social, political and economic role."87
The plurality emphasized the tribunal's role as an international court
that the Security Council established to "'halt and effectively redress' the
widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law
occurring in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and to contribute
thereby to the restoration and maintenance of peace."88 As such, the tribu-
nal was compelled to craft its decisions to "have the appropriate normative
effect upon soldiers bearing weapons of destruction and upon the com-
81. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opin-
ion of Judge Li, 27 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997), http://
www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/acjug/en/erd-asojli971007e.pdf.
82. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opin-
ion of Judge Cassese, 12 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/acjug/en/erd-adojcas971007e.pdff Prosecutor
v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Stephen
91 19 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997), http://www.icty.org/x/
cases/erdemovic/acjug/en/erd-asojste971007e.pdf.
83. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of
Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, 9 73-80.
84. Id. 9 49.
85. Id. 9 44.
86. Id. T 43, 73.
87. Id. 9 75.
88. Id.
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manders who control them in armed conflict situations."89 If the goal of
international humanitarian law is to protect "the weak and vulnerable," 90
the plurality argued, then the tribunal should not allow defendants to
escape responsibility for their crimes by entering a plea of duress.9 ' Addi-
tionally, the plurality expressed its expectation that soldiers or combatants
should "exercise fortitude and a greater degree of resistance to a threat
than civilians, at least when it is their own lives which are being
threatened." 92 Judges McDonald and Vohrah therefore rejected the defense
of duress for soldiers based on the argument that international law holds
soldiers to a higher duty than that to which it holds ordinary civilians.
The plurality rejected the dissenting judges' argument that the court
should implement, as one criterion for a successful duress defense, a pro-
portionality test to determine whether the defendant's actions actually
caused more harm than if the defendant had sacrificed himself.93 Since
the killings would have occurred regardless of whether Erdemovic agreed
to participate, the dissent argued that duress should be an available
defense because no action he could have taken would have prevented the
resulting crime.94 The plurality rejected this balancing of harms test, quot-
ing the prosecutor's argument that a weighing of harms would lead to "all
sorts of highly problematical philosophical discussions."95 In emphasiz-
ing its choice to establish a moral absolute, the plurality wrote: "The
approach we take does not involve a balancing of harms for and against
killing but rests upon an application in the context of international human-
itarian law of the rule that duress does not justify or excuse the killing of
an innocent person."9 6
Judge Cassese wrote a separate and dissenting opinion, in which he
criticized the plurality for "incorporat[ing] into international criminal pro-
ceedings ideas, legal constructs, concepts or terms of art which only
belong, and are unique, to a specific group of national legal systems .... ."97
Specifically, he objected to the plurality's adoption of the traditional com-
mon law duress jurisprudence. In Judge Cassese's view, the tribunal was
only authorized to enforce international law, and therefore should have
"refrain[ed] from engaging in meta-legal analyses" and should not have
"rel[ied] exclusively on notions, policy considerations or the philosophical
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. 9 80.
92. Id. 9 84.
93. See id. 9 80.
94. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion
ofJudge Cassese, 9 42 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997), http://
www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/acjug/en/erd-adojcas971007e.pdf.
95. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, joint Separate Opinion of Judge
McDonald and Judge Vohrah, 9 81 (quoting Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-
A, Appeals Transcript, 84-85, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 26,
1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/trans/en/9705261T.htm).
96. Id. 9 80.
97. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion
of Judge Cassese, 4.
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underpinnings of common-law countries, while disregarding those of civil-
law countries or other systems of law."9 8
In the absence of a standing rule of customary international law
regarding whether a defendant may plead duress against charges of war
crimes or crimes against humanity where the underlying offense is mur-
der, Judge Cassese believed the tribunal should have applied "the general
rule on duress."9 9 The preference for this general rule stemmed from prior
opinions of international tribunals, including the IMT's Einsatzgruppen
decision and the Israeli Supreme Court's decision in the Eichmann trial.10 0
Judge Cassese set out the following criteria for a successful defense of
duress for war crimes or crimes against humanity where the defendant
killed an innocent person:
(i) the act charged was done under an immediate threat of severe and irrepa-
rable harm to life or limb;
(ii) there was no adequate means of averting such evil;
(iii) the crime committed was not disproportionate to the evil threatened
(this would, for example, occur in case of killing in order to avert an assault).
In other words, in order not to be disproportionate, the crime committed
under duress must be, on balance, the lesser of two evils;
(iv) the situation leading to duress must not have been voluntarily brought
about by the person coerced.
In addition, . .. the existence in law of any special duty on the part of the
accused towards the victim may preclude the possibility of raising duress as
a defence.1 0 1
According to Judge Cassese, the most challenging requirement-propor-
tionality-would only succeed if the defendant could show that "it [was]
not a case of a direct choice between the life of the person acting under
duress and the life of the victim . . . .o102 Consequently, Judge Cassese
emphasized the high hurdle that the proportionality requirement would
require defendants to clear:
The third criterion-proportionality . . .- will, in practice, be the hardest to
satisfy where the underlying offence involves the killing of innocents. Per-
haps . . . it will never be satisfied where the accused is saving his own life at
the expense of his victim, since there are enormous, perhaps insurmounta-
98. Id. 11(ii).
99. Id. 9 12.
100. See id. T 33. Adolf Eichmann coordinated the deportation of Jews from western,
southern, and northern Europe to the extermination camps in Eastern Europe. After the
war, he fled to Argentina, where Israeli Security Service agents found him and arranged
for his extradition to Israel in 1960. Eichmann was charged with crimes against the
Jewish people and crimes against humanity. An Israeli court found him guilty on multi-
ple counts and sentenced him to death. See Hans W. Baade, The Eichmann Trial: Some
Legal Aspects, 1961 DUKE .J. 400, 400 (1961); Eichmann Trial, U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMO-
RUAL MUSEUM, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?Moduleld=10005179 (last
updated May 11, 2012).
101. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion
of Judge Cassese, T 16.
102. Id. 1 42 (emphasis omitted).
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ble, philosophical, moral and legal difficulties in putting one life in the bal-
ance against that of others .... 103
Therefore, if Erdemovit could prove that the murder of thousands of Mus-
lim men and boys would have occurred regardless of his participation, he
should have been able to raise a successful defense of duress against the
charges.10 4
C. The Rome Statute
The next institution to set a significant standard regarding the use of
the defense of duress for the killing of innocent persons was the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC). The international community spent seventy-
five years debating the terms of the Rome Statute, which laid the founda-
tion for the ICC.' 0 5 The Rome Statute was finally adopted on July 17,
1998 and went into force on July 1, 2002.106 Article 31 lays out the con-
fines of the defense of duress for war crimes and crimes against humanity
in the following terms:
1. In addition to other grounds for excluding criminal responsibility pro-
vided for in this Statute, a person shall not be criminally responsible if, at
the time of that person's conduct:
(d) The conduct which is alleged to constitute a crime within the juris-
diction of the Court has been caused by duress resulting from a threat of
imminent death or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm
against that person or another person, and the person acts necessarily
and reasonably to avoid this threat, provided that the person does not
intend to cause a greater harm than the one sought to be avoided. Such a
threat may either be:
(i) Made by other persons; or
103. Id.
104. See id. 44 ("Thus the case-law seems to make an exception for those instances
where - on the facts - it is highly probable, if not certain, that if the person acting under
duress had refused to commit the crime, the crime would in any event have been carried
out by persons other than the accused. The commonest example of such a case is where
an execution squad has been assembled to kill the victims, and the accused participates,
in some form, in the execution squad, either as an active member or as an organiser,
albeit only under the threat of death. In this case, if an individual member of the execu-
tion squad first refuses to obey but has then to comply with the order as a result of
duress, he may be excused: indeed, whether or not he is killed or instead takes part in
the execution, the civilians, prisoners of war, etc., would be shot anyway. Were he to
comply with his legal duty not to shoot innocent persons, he would forfeit his life for no
benefit to anyone and no effect whatsoever apart from setting a heroic example for man-
kind (which the law cannot demand him to set): his sacrifice of his own life would be to
no avail. In this case the evil threatened (the menace to his life and his subsequent
death) would be greater than the remedy (his refraining from committing the crime, i.e.,
from participating in the execution).").
105. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Preface to the First Edition, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT xxix, xxix (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed.
2008) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE].
106. Philippe Kirsch, Introduction to the Second Edition, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME
STATUTE, supra note 105, at xxxiii.
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(ii) Constituted by other circumstances beyond that person's
control.
2. The Court shall determine the applicability of the grounds for excluding
criminal responsibility provided for in this Statute to the case before it.107
Commentators criticized the drafters of the Rome Statute for combining
the concepts of necessity and duress, thereby creating a hybrid defense
that serves as both a justification and an excuse. 0 8 For example, Albin
Eser argues "paragraph 1(d) blends the justifying choice of a lesser evil
(necessity) with excusing situations where the defendant's freedom of will
and decision is so severely limited that there is eventually no moral choice
available (duress)."' 0 9 Despite this criticism, the proportionality require-
ment closely mirrors the precedents set by the IMT and Judge Cassese's
dissent in Erdemovie.110
III. Applying Current International Law Standards to Pleas of Duress
by Civilian Perpetrators
A. Applicable Law
Based on the precedent set by the IMT, the conflicting opinions in the
Erdemovie appeal, and the recent adoption of the Rome Statute's require-
ments for duress, an international tribunal should allow a civilian, who did
not hold a leadership position within the civil government, to raise an
affirmative defense of duress. Since the plurality in Erdemovic limited itself
to deciding whether a soldier could raise a defense of duress against
charges of war crimes or crimes against humanity when he has killed an
innocent person, it never expressly precluded the possibility of a civilian
claiming duress for a similar crime."'
Both the plurality and the dissent in Erdemovie stressed the impor-
tance of requiring soldiers and certain government officials to exercise a
107. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 31, July 17, 1998, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
108. See, e.g., Albin Eser, Article 31: Grounds for Excluding Criminal Responsibility, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE, supra note 105, at 883 ("Among the many com-
promises which had to be made in order to get this Statute accepted, paragraph 1(d) is
one of the least convincing provisions, as in an ill-guided and lastly failed attempt, it
tried to combine two different concepts: (justifying) 'necessity' and (merely excusing)
'duress."' (footnote omitted)); Kai Ambos, General Principles of Criminal Law in the Rome
Statute, 10 CRIM. L.F. 1, 27-28 (1999) ("The drafting, however, mixes up different con-
cepts relating to duress on the one hand, and necessity on the other. . .. Subparagraph
(d) uses objective elements of both concepts. The 'threat' refers to necessity and duress,
while the 'necessary and reasonable reaction' refers only to necessity, introducing a new
subjective requirement which relates to the choice of evils criterion. Further, the distinc-
tion between a threat made by persons and a threat constituted by other circumstances
beyond the person's control refers to duress (the former) and necessity (the latter). In
sum, the drafting confirms the conceptual vagueness surrounding international crimi-
nal law defences." (footnotes omitted))
109. Eser, supra note 108, at 884 (footnotes omitted).
110. See infra Parts II.A, II.B.2.
111. See infra Part II.B.2.
178 Vol. 46
2013 The Applicability of the Duress Defense
higher level of resistance to coercion.112 The presence of a higher duty of
care toward other members of society was likely a determinative factor in
the plurality's decision." 3 However, this concern should not factor into an
analysis of whether to allow civilians to assert a defense of duress because
civilians are generally not held to any particular duty of care in relation to
others.114
Likewise, the plurality's emphasis on creating international law that
should "guide the conduct of combatants and their commanders" would
not be as great of a concern in a case dealing with crimes committed by
civilians." 5 Granted, military commanders could order civilians to com-
mit crimes in order to avoid subjecting their own soldiers to criminal liabil-
ity. However, in these instances the commanders, rather than the civilians,
should be held accountable for these crimes because the civilians were act-
ing under duress and were carrying out the will of the coercing party.
Given that all three of the previously discussed standards for duress-
those set by the IMT, Judge Cassese, and the Rome Statute-require that
the person acting under duress did not cause a disproportionate amount of
harm compared to the harm threatened against him, it is likely that an
international court would impose the same requirement for a civilian's
duress claim. Although many scholars have criticized this proportionality
test for combining the excuse and justification rationales for the defense of
duress,1 6 there is no evidence that international courts will soon abandon
this well-established standard. Therefore, for the purposes of the forthcom-
112. See Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of
Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah, 84 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Oct. 7, 1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/acjug/en/erd-asojmcd971007e.
pdf; Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Cassese, 9 42 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997), http://
www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/acjug/en/erd-adojcas971007e.pdf.
113. See Chiesa, supra note 13, at 765 ("[W]hether a coerced actor voluntarily
assumed duties of self-sacrifice should have a profound effect on the proportionality
that society is willing to require in order for the actor to successfully plead duress.").
114. Id. at 772 ("While the law should not generally demand that most people resist
threats to their lives in order to avoid harm to third parties, it is perfectly legitimate to
require such a degree of courage from people who, like soldiers, have assumed certain
duties towards to [sic] the general populace.").
115. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge
McDonald and Judge Vohrah, 80.
116. For an argument in favor of viewing this proportionality requirement as an
excuse, rather than a justification, see Chiesa, supra note 13, at 770-71. "The fact that
the coerced actor's victims would have died soon anyway is relevant to determining
whether the actor's conduct generates sufficient understanding among the public to war-
rant an exemption from criminal liability . . . . Thus, although a coerced actor who
harms an innocent victim may act wrongfully despite the fact that she could not have
prevented the harm, this fact provides a sound reason to excuse her conduct. There is
no need to inquire whether the harm caused was proportional to the harm averted in
order to determine whether to excuse the coerced actor. Because the actor effectively
lacked the capacity to prevent the harm threatened from occurring, punishing the actor
for deciding to save her own life instead of dying to protect innocent people who were
going to die anyway would be unfair. In sum, yielding to the coercive threats in this case
is wrongful but perfectly understandable and, hence, not punishable." Id. (footnote
omitted).
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ing analyses, I will assume that an international court would require that
the defendant show that the harm he caused by relenting to the duress was
not disproportionate to the harm that would have occurred if he had sacri-
ficed his own life.
The remaining significant difference between the standards set by the
aforementioned international legal institutions is the "no fault" require-
ment imposed by both the IMT and Judge Cassese. This criterion for
duress requires a defendant to show that he was not responsible for placing
himself in the situation that lead to the unlawful coercion. In comparison,
the Rome Statute does not include a similar requirement. However, an
international criminal tribunal would likely reject a defense of duress from
a defendant who joined a criminal organization willingly and then pleaded
duress after he was forced to commit unlawful acts. Whether the defen-
dant willingly participated in a criminal enterprise in which he should
have reasonably expected to be required to commit unlawful acts strikes at
the heart of whether the defendant had any "real moral choice" in commit-
ting the crimes.117 If the defendant knew or should have known that the
organization he had joined was "purposefully intent upon actions contrary
to international humanitarian law," then the court should not permit him
to assert a defense of duress. 113 However, if the defendant could not have
reasonably known that the organization engaged in criminal activity, then
the court should allow the defense of duress so long as the other require-
ments are satisfied.' 19
Based on previous case law, as well as the international community's
adoption of the standards set for duress in the Rome Statute, the following
criteria should apply to a civilian who wishes to assert an affirmative
defense of duress for charges of war crimes or crimes against humanity
where the civilian has killed an innocent person:
117. See KNOOPS, supra note 20, at 50-54 (discussing the "no fault" requirement
established by Judge Cassese in Erdemovie and emphasizing the importance of the avail-
ability of a moral choice in determining whether to assign criminal culpability to
defendants).
118. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion
of Judge Cassese T 50 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7, 1997), http://
www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/acjug/en/erd-adojcas971007e.pdf ("More particularly,
in applying the conclusions of law which I have reached above, in my view the Trial
Chamber to which the matter is remitted must first of all determine whether the situa-
tion leading to duress was voluntarily brought about by the Appellant. In particular, the
Trial Chamber must satisfy itself whether the military unit to which he belonged and in
which he had voluntarily enlisted . .. was purposefully intent upon actions contrary to
international humanitarian law and the Appellant either knew or should have known of
this when he joined the Unit or, if he only later became aware of it, that he then failed to
leave the Unit or otherwise disengage himself from such actions. If the answer to this be
in the affirmative, the Appellant could not plead duress. Equally, he could not raise this
defence if he in any other way voluntarily placed himself in a situation he knew would
entail the unlawful execution of civilians. If, on the other hand, the above question be
answered in the negative, and thus the Appellant would be entitled to urge duress, and
the Trial Chamber must then satisfy itself that the other strict conditions required by
international criminal law to prove duress are met in the instant case . . .
119. See id.
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(1) The act charged was done under an imminent threat of death or serious
bodily harm;
(2) there was no adequate means of escaping the threat;
(3) the crime committed was not disproportionate to the evil threatened, so
that the harm caused by obeying the order did not outweigh the harm
threatened against the defendant;
(4) the defendant did not voluntarily place himself in a situation in which
he would be required to perform the unlawful act; and
(5) the defendant did not owe any special duty of care toward the victim.
B. Case Studies
The following are examples of instances when courts should have
allowed civilians to raise an affirmative defense of duress to charges of war
crimes and crimes against humanity that involved the killing of an inno-
cent person. The first case study features Johann Vican, a former concen-
tration camp prisoner and capo. Vican was tried before a U.S. military
court in Dachau and found guilty of violating the laws and usages of war
through wrongfully encouraging, aiding, abetting, or participating in the
deaths of other prisoners. 120 He was sentenced to twenty years in
prison. 1 2 1 The second case study features Felix, a Rwandan man who was
part of a group that beat a boy to death with clubs.122 After the genocide,
he confessed to his involvement in the murder and was imprisoned for an
unknown number of years.12 3 The following paragraphs will now apply
the standards for duress as explained above in Part III, Section A, to both of
these case studies.
1. Former Concentration Camp Capo Johann Vican
On July 8, 1945, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff issued the "Direc-
tive on the Identification and Apprehension of Persons Suspected of War
Crimes or Other Offenses and Trial of Certain Offenders" (.S.C. 1023/
10).124 The directive called on "[aippropriate military courts" to conduct
trials of suspected criminals in their custody.12 5 These military courts
received jurisdiction over crimes involving:
a. Atrocities and offenses against persons or property constituting viola-
tions of international law, including the laws, rules and customs of land and
naval warfare.
120. United States v. Vican, Case No. 000-Flossenburg-3, 1, VI (Gen. Military Gov't
Court at Dachau, Dec. 1, 1947).
121. See id. 'i IV, VI.
122. See LEE ANN Fujil, KILLING NEIGHBORS: WEBS OF VIOLENCE IN RWANDA 158-64
(2009).
123. Id. at 158-60.
124. See TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE
NUERNBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 (1949), app. C
("Directive on the Identification and Apprehension of Persons Suspected of War Crimes
or Other Offenses and Trial of Certain Offenders").
125. Id. annex to app. A to enclosure B, art. 7.
181
Cornell International Law Journal
b. Initiation of invasions of other countries and of wars of aggression in
violation of international laws and treaties.
c. Other atrocities and offenses, including atrocities and persecutions on
racial, religious or political grounds, committed since 30 January 1933.126
J.S.C. 1023/10 also authorized personal jurisdiction over middle- and
lower-level Nazi criminals, thus granting military courts jurisdiction over
members of the SS who had served as camp guards and doctors, and even
former prisoners who had committed crimes while serving as block lead-
ers and capos.127
In order to maintain order within the concentration camps, the SS
appointed certain prisoners as block elders and capos.128 These prisoners
were assigned the task of keeping the other inmates under control and
enforcing the rules of the camp.12 9 In exchange for collaboration, the
capos received additional rations and enjoyed marginally better living con-
ditions than their fellow inmates.130 Many prisoners accepted positions as
capos as a means of surviving the harsh conditions in the camps.'13 Sur-
vival became the prisoners' number one priority due to hard labor and
starvation diets.' 3 2 As one former prisoner reflected: "How was I able to
survive in Auschwitz? My principle is: I come first, second, and third.
Then nothing, then again I; and then all the others."' 3 3
As part of their duties, the SS required capos to beat inmates who
violated a camp rule.' 3 4 Although the SS imposed a lower limit on the
severity of these beatings, they did not generally impose an upper limit.'3 5
Therefore, it became common for capos to use excessive force when
inflicting punishments on other prisoners.1 36 Whether the additional
force was motivated by a fear of reprisal for administering an insufficient
punishment, or by a sadistic desire to inflict suffering on others, depended
entirely on the personality of the individual capo.' 3 7 Some capos inten-
tionally murdered other prisoners, sometimes on behalf of the SS, but
126. Id. art. 2.
127. Michael Bryant, Die US-amerikanischen Militargerichtsprozesse Gegen SS-Per-
sonal, Arzte und Kapos des KZ Dachau 1945 - 1948, in DAc-tAUER PROZESSE: NS-VER-
BRECHEN VOR AMERIKANISCHEN MILITARGERICHTEN IN DAcHAU 1945 - 1948, 109, 109
(Ludwig Eiber & Robert Sigel eds., 2007).
128. See, e.g., id. at 119 (discussing the role of capos in the concentration camp
system).
129. Id.
130. FERN OVERBEY HILTON, THE DAcHAU DEFENDANTS: LIFE STORIES FROM TESTIMONY
AND DOCUMENTS OF THE WAR CRIMES PROSECUTIONS 30-31 (2004).
131. See id.
132. See PRIMO LEVI, THE DROWNED AND THE SAVED 75-81 (Raymond Rosenthal trans.,
Vintage International 1989) (1986) (discussing the desperation felt by many concentra-
tion camp prisoners due to the conditions in the camps).
133. Id. at 79 (quoting Ella Lingens-Reiner in Prisoners of Fear).
134. See HILTON, supra note 130, at 31.
135. See LEVI, supra note 132, at 46.
136. Id.
137. See Das KZ Dachau 1942 bis 1945: 8.4 Funktionshaftlinge, Prisoners in Special
Functions, HAUS DER BAYERISCHEN GESCHICHTE, http://www.hdbg.de/dachau/dachaudie-
ausstellung_02 Abteilung-08.php (last visited Nov. 12, 2012).
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often on their own initiative.' 38
Despite their positions of authority over other inmates, capos were still
subject to the rule of the SS guards.139 If they failed to obey or carry out
orders correctly, "regardless of whether they threatened the health or even
lives of their fellow-prisoners," capos risked receiving punishment them-
selves.'o Some capos used their positions to help other prisoners by
blackmailing SS guards or switching prisoner names on transfer lists.141
In performing these small acts of resistance, the capos ran the risk of dis-
covery and punishment. "The question of whether to cooperate in the
administration of the prisoner camp, which was ultimately an instrument
of the SS terror, or to refuse participation, thereby relinquishing any hope
of exerting influence to the benefit of the other prisoners, basically
remained an irresolvable dilemma."' 4 2
Johann Vican was born in Czechoslovakia in 1913.143 His family later
moved to Linz, Austria, where Vican began to have minor run-ins with the
law.' 44 He was arrested thirteen times between 1930 and 1940, generally
on charges of disorderly conduct or general hooliganism.' 45 To demon-
strate his opposition to the German annexation of Austria, Vican climbed a
flagpole in Klein-Munchen and tore down the Nazi flag.146 Soon thereaf-
ter, the German authorities expelled him from Austria.147 He was arrested
again in 1940 when he re-entered Austria to visit his mother.148 Vican was
sent to Dachau and categorized as a criminal,149 but was released in 1943
under the condition that he join the SS.150 However, he refused to fulfill
this promise and was subsequently arrested by the Gestapo.151 Returning
prisoners, known within the camp as "second-timers," were generally sub-
jected to worse conditions and more brutal work assignments than the rest
of the camp's inmate population.' 52 Upon his return to Dachau, Vican
suffered a beating of twenty-five lashes and was assigned to work in the
stone quarry, where he was expected to be "finished off."' 5 3 Vican's
weight dropped to one hundred pounds, but he survived.' 54 In October
1944, Vican was transferred to a sub-camp of Flossenbiurg, where he nearly
died of acidone poisoning.' 55 After his release from the sick bay, the SS
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See LEVI, supra note 132, at 45.
142. Das KZ Dachau 1942 bis 1945: 8.4 Funktionshaftlinge, supra note 137.
143. HILTON, supra note 130, at 28.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 29.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. STANISLAV ZAMECNIK, DAs wAR DACHAU (2d. ed. 2010).
153. HILTON, supra note 130, at 29.
154. Id.
155. Id.
183
Cornell International Law Journal
assigned Vican to the position of block eldest and then to capo."s 6 He held
this position from January 1945 until American forces took him prisoner
in May.15 7 Subsequently, Vican was housed with other former prison-
ers.158 At the time, none of these prisoners attacked Vican or accused him
of mistreatment.159
Vican was tried at Dachau on October 2, 1947 before a Military Gov-
ernment Court.160 He was charged with violating the laws and usages of
war through wrongfully encouraging, aiding, abetting, or participating in
the deaths of an unknown Russian and two unknown Polish nationals at
Flossenbitrg Concentration Camp.16' He pleaded guilty to the charges.162
The prosecution presented into evidence extrajudicial sworn statements by
former prisoners who claimed that they had witnessed Vican beat his
alleged victims to death.163 Vican admitted to beating other prisoners on
"about [fifty] occasions . . . for violations of camp regulations."'16 4 The
defense found a witness (a former capo) who was prepared to testify that
Vican "beat inmates only for the purpose of maintaining order and disci-
pline and was not unnecessarily brutal."165 Vican was sentenced to twenty
years in prison.166
2. Fix
Less information is known about the background and case history for
the second defendant, Flix.167 Dr. Lee Ann Fujii interviewed Felix while
she was conducting research for a study on the various levels of civilian
participation and resistance during the Rwandan genocide.168 After the
1994 genocide, two different judicial systems sought to bring the perpetra-
tors of the genocide to justice: the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) and the national courts within Rwanda.169 The U.N.
Security Council created the ICTR in November 1994 to try persons
accused of genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of Common
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See United States v. Vican, Case No. 000-Flossenburg-3, I I (Gen. Military Gov't
Court at Dachau, Dec. 1, 1947).
161. Id. T II-IV.
162. HILTON, supra note 130, at 30.
163. Id. at 29-30; United States v. Vican, Case No. 000-Flossenburg-3, T IV.
164. United States v. Vican, Case No. 000-Flossenburg-3, IV.
165. Id.
166. Id. T9 IV, VI.
167. F61ix is a pseudonym. The defendant's real name is unknown, since he was
featured as part of a research project on the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide. See
Fuju, supra note 122, at 16-17.
168. See generally id.
169. See generally AISON DES FORGES, HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE
STORY: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 736-61 (1999) (describing the jurisdictional reach and gov-
erning law of the ICTR and the national Rwandan courts in prosecuting perpetrators of
the Rwandan genocide).
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Article 3 and Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions. 170 The Security
Council created the ICTR specifically for the prosecution of government
officials who instigated and encouraged the genocide. 171 Its jurisdiction
took precedence over the national courts of U.N. member states.172
Since the ICTR focused on the leaders of the genocide, Rwandan
national courts assumed the task of prosecuting lower-level perpetrators
and collaborators. In August 1996, the Rwandan National Assembly
passed a law regulating prosecutions for "genocide, crimes against human-
ity, and other crimes committed in connection with them."173 The law
created four categories of defendants, ranked in order of the severity of
their alleged crimes. Category one included persons who had helped to
plan, organize, incite, or supervise the genocide and included both
national and local officials and civil leaders; category two included plan-
ners or accomplices in the murders or attacks leading to the death of the
victims; category three included persons who had caused serious injury to
individuals; and category four included persons who had committed prop-
erty crimes.' 74 The law offered perpetrators the chance to receive a more
lenient sentence if they confessed to and apologized for their crimes.' 75
Most of the killings that occurred in Rwanda involved a combination
of military or government officials, politicians, and civilians acting as per-
petrators.' 7 6 The perpetrators generally travelled in groups, often recruit-
ing new members as they made their way from house to house.17 7 "Group
activities began with conducting night patrols and manning roadblocks,
then escalated" to include the theft of property, beatings, and killings.' 78
In order to spread the genocide, organizers sent perpetrators from the areas
where the killings were already underway to communities where the
authorities had refused to encourage participation in the killings. 1
According to a Human Rights Watch Report: "[Tihe military encouraged
and, when faced with reluctance to act, compelled both ordinary citizens
and local administrators to participate in attacks, even travelling the back
roads and stopping at small marketplaces to deliver the message."180
Although many perpetrators claimed that they were forced to participate in
the crimes, few took advantage of subsequent opportunities to escape.181
170. Id. at 737-38.
171. Id. at 738.
172. Id. at 740.
173. Id. at 749-50.
174. Id. at 750.
175. Id. at 752.
176. See generally id. at 9, 222-41 (describing the collaborative efforts of the adminis-
trative, political, and military structures in Rwanda to perpetrate and rapidly spread the
genocide).
177. Id. at 9; see also Jane Flanagan, We Killed Seven Children That Night, THE TELE
GRAPH (June 23, 2002, 12:01 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africa
andindianocean/rwanda/ 1398160/We-killed-seven-children-that-night.html.
178. Fuju, supra note 122, at 160.
179. See DES FORGES, supra note 169, at 9.
180. Id. at 8.
181. See Fuju, supra note 122, at 165.
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Felix was one of the accused who chose to confess to his crimes in
order to receive leniency from the prosecution.' 8 2 In his interview with Dr.
Fujii, he confessed to being in a group that killed a Tutsi boy.' 83 On the
day of the crime, Flix was out harvesting in his coffee field.184 A group of
three leaders of the Interahamwe (a Hutu paramilitary group) approached
him and ordered him to join other Hutu community members at the road-
block.18 5 They told him they would hurt him if he refused. Felix accompa-
nied the men to the roadblock, where "they were killing someone in front of
[his] eyes."' 86 After the group finished beating the boy to death, the others
ordered Felix to bury the body.18 7 Felix told them that he was going to get
his things, and then ran away.' 88 In his interview with Dr. Fujii, he
explained that if he had refused to go to the roadblock, the three men could
have killed him.' 89 He also told Dr. Fujii that he feared for the safety of his
wife, who lay seriously ill at their home.190 After fleeing the Interahamwe,
Felix hid.191 He claimed that he never beat or killed anyone, and this act
was the only crime he committed during the genocide.192
C. Application of the Defense of Duress to the Case Study Defendants
1. The Act Charged Was Done Under an Imminent Threat of Death or
Serious Bodily Harm
Both Vican and Felix would likely succeed in satisfying this first crite-
rion. In Vican's case, the threat of death constantly loomed over the con-
centration camp prisoners. Offenses as slight as stepping on the wrong
strip of grass or taking an extra piece of bread could lead to beatings,
denial of meals, pole-hanging, or even death.193 Capos were subject to the
same rules as the rest of the camp, and faced similar consequences if they
disobeyed an order from a camp guard or failed to perform their duties.194
The threat of death or serious bodily harm was, therefore, imminent.
Flix similarly held an honest belief that he could have been killed if
he failed to accompany the Interahamwe leaders to the roadblock.
182. Since Felix was tried before a national court, the international law on duress
would not apply to his case. However, I am using the facts of this case to answer the
hypothetical question of whether Felix should have been afforded the opportunity to
enter an affirmative defense of duress if his case had come before an international court,
such as the ICTR.
183. See Fujii, supra note 122, at 158-59.
184. Id. at 159.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 160.
193. Das KZ Dachau 1942 bis 1945: 6.7 Strafen und Terror, Punishment and Terror,
HAUS DER BAYERISCHEN GESCHICHTE, http://www.hdbg.de/dachau/pdfs/06/06_07/06_07
_01.pdf (last visited Nov. 12, 2012).
194. See Das KZ Dachau 1942 bis 1945: 8.4 Funktionshaftlinge, supra note 137.
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Although he told Dr. Fujii that he was not aware of anyone else who had
been killed for refusing to comply with the Interahamwe, he told her that
he was afraid of the Interahamwe leaders. 195 According to Dr. Fujii, coer-
cion to join the killing groups in Ngali, F1ix's region, was "direct and
immediate," and often "took the form of face-to-face recruitment and intim-
idation."1 96 Another interview subject told Dr. Fujii that the leader of the
Interahamwe group that had threatened FMlix had also threatened the lives
of other men, including their own family members, who initially refused to
participate in the killings.197 Given the intimidation methods the leaders
of the Interahamwe used, coupled with their obvious willingness to kill
innocent people, it is reasonable for a court to determine that the threat
against Felix fulfilled the requirement of imminence.
2. There Was No Adequate Means of Escaping the Threat
Both Vican and Felix should also be able to satisfy the second require-
ment. As a concentration camp prisoner, Vican did not have an opportu-
nity to escape the ever-present threat of the SS. He could not voluntarily
leave the camp, and neither could he refuse to obey an order from the SS
without incurring punishment. Although there are records of capos who
refused to carry out orders to beat other prisoners, 198 Vican could argue
that his fear of punishment for disobeying orders was legitimate and rea-
sonable. Block elders and capos took a risk each time they refused to carry
out an order by the SS, and although refusing to punish their fellow prison-
ers was certainly honorable, it was also dangerous. From the perspective of
a proponent of the Excuse Theory of the duress defense, Vican should not
have been expected to act as reasonable hero, but rather as reasonable
man.199 Therefore, if a reasonable man in his position would have felt that
he would risk severe punishment or death for refusing to obey the coercive
195. Fujn, supra note 122, at 159.
196. Id. at 158.
197. Id. at 135 (recounting an interview with a survivor who had been friends with
the leader's nephew. According to the survivor, the nephew was forcibly recruited into
the killing group: "[The uncle] was the head of Pawa. He was powerful and he told [my
friend] to join the Interahamwe and if he did not join them, they were going to hurt
him." Dr. Fujii then asked the survivor if he believed the uncle would have, in fact,
killed his nephew if he had disobeyed the order. The survivor responded in the affirma-
tive.) (alteration in original).
198. See, e.g., the eye witness of an account of former prisoner Karel Kauik found at
Das KZ Dachau 1942 bis 1945: 8.4 Funktionshaftlinge, supra note 137:
On August 4, [1943] a whipping of 16 prisoners took place on the roll call
grounds. The entire camp was forced to watch. Each man received 25 blows
with an ox tail from the block elder. During the procedure, the camp leader,
Redwitz, was in charge. I note that the block elders of the Czech block 20,
Hauff, and the block elders of the religious blocks 26 and 28, Karl Frey und [sic]
Kaspar Bachl, who had his hands bandaged and pretended to be unable to give
the beatings, refused to carry out the punishment. All three of them were Com-
munists, men of true character. The block elder of the Russian block 17,
Sturmann No. 17560, however, showed himself to be utterly without political
character, a first class rogue and scoundrel.
199. See generally KNOOPs, supra note 20.
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order, then a court should acknowledge that Vican had no reasonable
means of escape from the duress.
Likewise, Felix did not appear to have an opportunity to escape the
threat. The Interahamwe leaders approached him while he was working in
a field.200 There were three men, so it was unlikely that he could have
easily run away. According to Dr. Fujii, Ft1ix's recruitment was common in
that most other people who were coerced into joining a killing squad also
felt they could not refuse to go when the "leaders or their henchmen con-
fronted them in person."201 A court should therefore find that it was rea-
sonable for a person in F1ix's position to believe that he had no means of
escaping the threat against him.
3. The Crime Committed Was Not Disproportionate to the Evil Threatened,
so that the Harm Caused by Obeying the Order Did Not Outweigh the
Harm Threatened Against the Defendant
In order to weigh the harm caused by obeying the order against the
harm threatened against the defendant, the court would engage in a bal-
ancing test. Vican was charged with beating prisoners, resulting in the
death of three prisoners. 202 The prosecutor would likely argue that caus-
ing the death of three prisoners and beating fifty prisoners resulted in a
greater harm than if Vican had accepted his fate as a regular inmate or
refused to administer the unlawful punishments as a capo. Even if Vican
had died, the death of one prisoner would have been less "harmful" than
the death of three. Given the fungibility of the prisoner leadership within
the camps, Vican could argue that if he had refused to serve as a capo,
another prisoner simply would have taken his place. The SS generally
required the capos to beat prisoners for infractions, and given the weak-
ened condition of the majority of camp inmates, it was probable that these
beatings would contribute to or hasten the deaths of at least a few persons.
Therefore, even if Vican had refused the position of capo, the total number
of prisoners who died in the camp would not have been any different.
Felix should not have any difficulty fulfilling this requirement. His
participation in the death of the Tutsi boy appears to be minimal. Since
various other members of the Interahamwe were present at the roadblock,
it is very likely that the boy would have died regardless of whether or not
Flix had agreed to accompany the other men to the roadblock.
4. The Defendant Did Not Voluntarily Place Himself in a Situation in
Which He Would be Required to Perform the Unlawful Act
Vican may have some difficulty satisfying the fourth requirement, but
should ultimately prevail. Although the SS gave many prisoners the choice
of whether to accept a position as a capo, refusing this "promotion" would
200. Fuji, supra note 122, at 159.
201. Id. at 160.
202. United States v. Vican, Case No. 000-Flossenburg-3, 9 11 (Gen. Military Gov't
Court at Dachau, Dec. 1, 1947).
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have meant certain death for many prisoners. Within weeks after his
return to Dachau, Vican weighed only one hundred pounds.203 From late
1944 until liberation in late April or early May 1945, conditions in Dachau,
Flossenbuirg, and Mauthausen, as well as their sub-camps, grew drastically
dire.204 New transports of prisoners from the eastern camps began to
arrive regularly, and there was not nearly enough food or shelter for all of
the prisoners.205 One can question whether, under such circumstances,
Vican still enjoyed any "freedom of choice" in accepting the position of
capo. Both the Human Frailty Theory and the Involuntariness Theory sup-
port a finding that Vican's decision to become a capo was more likely
coerced than voluntary. The coercion was inflicted not only through daily
threats of death and torture, but also through the inhumane conditions of
the camp. Under extreme circumstances, Vican grasped at an opportunity
to save his own life, as most people would when their survival instincts
take effect. If Vican could convince the court that his choice to become a
capo was a life-or-death decision, he may be successful in arguing that he
did not voluntarily insert himself into a position in which he would be
expected to obey unlawful orders.
In contrast, Felix should have little difficulty fulfilling this require-
ment. He did not voluntarily join the Interahamwe, and he fled the killing
group at the first opportunity. One could argue that, if Felix wanted to
avoid the risk of recruitment, he should have hid earlier or chosen not to
work in the fields. However, the criminal justice system should not impose
a penalty on a person for putting himself in a situation in which he might
be recruited to perform an unlawful act if the person was performing a
daily routine.
5. The Defendant Did Not Owe Any Special Duty of Care Toward the
Victim
Both Vican and Felix should be able to easily satisfy this requirement
of the duress defense. Neither man was in a position in which he assumed
a special duty of care over others. Some concentration camp capos volun-
tarily assumed a duty of care over the other prisoners and did everything
in their power to protect them. However, for reasons discussed above, it
would not be reasonable for a court to apply this duty of care to all capos.
It is unknown whether Felix had a pre-existing duty of care toward the
Tutsi boy who was killed; such a duty may have existed if he was related to
the boy or the boy was a neighbor or family friend. However, given the lack
203. HILTON, supra note 130, at 29.
204. See Das KZ Dachau 1942 bis 1945: 12.1 Auflasung des KZ-Systems, Collapse of the
Concentration Camp System, HAuS DER BAYERISCHEN GESCHICHTE, http://www.hdbg.de/
dachau/pdfs/12/12_01/1201_02.PDF (last visited Nov. 12, 2012); Das KZ Dachau
1942 bis 1945: 12.2 Dachau in der Endphase, Dachau in the Final Stage, HAUS DER BAYERIs-
CHEN GEscHIcHTE, http://www.hdbg.de/dachau/pdfs/12/12-02/12_02_01.PDF (last
visited Nov. 12, 2012).
205. See Das KZ Dachau 1942 bis 1945: 12.2 Dachau in der Endphase, supra note 204.
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of evidence indicating any connection between F61ix and the boy, I will
assume that no such duty of care existed.
D. Summary of the Analysis of the Case Studies
Based on the requirements for duress discussed above, and their appli-
cation to the facts of each of the case studies, it appears that both Vican
and Felix would have a good chance of succeeding in raising affirmative
defenses of duress for their crimes. Since neither was in a leadership posi-
tion over other perpetrators, none of the policy arguments of the plurality
in Erdemovie should apply to their situations. Even if the defense of duress
had been unavailable to either of these men, it is unlikely that it would have
been sufficient to deter them from resisting the duress in the moment in
which it occurred. Although there should be "legal limits as to the conduct
of combatants and their commanders in armed conflict," 206 these same
legal limits should not apply to civilians who are coerced by military per-
sonnel or other civilians to engage in unlawful conduct. Imposing such a
limit on the use of the defense would impose on civilians a higher duty of
care, similar to that held by soldiers. The imposition of such a duty would
run contrary to the rationale behind the defense of duress, which sets
expectations for the "reasonable man," rather than for the "reasonable
hero."207
Conclusion
An international tribunal should permit a civilian to raise an affirma-
tive defense of duress for war crimes or crimes against humanity involving
the killing of an innocent person. Although a court has yet to rule on the
applicability of this defense to civilians who have committed murder, based
on prior precedents set by the IMT, the ICTY, and the Rome Statute, an
international court is likely to permit the defense. The majority of the pol-
icy concerns raised by the plurality in Erdemovie would not apply to a civil-
ian defendant. Civilians would not face a higher duty of care, as soldiers
do, and the international court would not need to concern itself with set-
ting guidelines for military combatants and commanders during times of
war. In keeping with the precedent set by most international institutions,
civilians would only be able to successfully raise a defense of duress if they
could show that the harm caused by their acquiescence to the threat did
not outweigh the harm that would have be caused if they had sacrificed
their own lives. As illustrated by the two case studies above, allowing civil-
ians to assert a defense of duress would prevent the imposition of criminal
liability on persons who became the victim of unfortunate circumstances
during times of war.
206. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge
McDonald and Judge Vohrah, 80 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 7,
1997), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/erdemovic/acjug/en/erd-asojmcd971007e.pdf.
207. See Chiesa, supra note 13, at 757.
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